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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Charles Anthony Capone appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree murder, failure to notify coroner or 
law enforcement of death, conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law 
enforcement of death and a persistent violator enhancement.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
Capone and Rachael Anderson started dating in February 2009 and were 
married in September 2009.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 846, Ls. 1-21.)  On or around 
December 27, 2009, Rachael reported to the Clarkston Police Department that 
Capone choked and attacked her.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 908, L. 15 – p. 909, L. 9; 9/4/14 
Tr., p. 1187, L. 9 – p. 1188, L. 14.)  Rachael then left Capone and filed for 
divorce.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 846, L. 22 – p. 847, L. 5, p. 936, Ls. 9-24; 9/5/14 Tr., p. 
1359, L. 10 – p. 1361, L. 6; Ex. 73.)  The earliest the divorce could be finalized 
was on or around April 12, 2010.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1363, L. 22 – p. 1364, L. 14.)  
Capone did not want a divorce.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1004, L. 15 – p. 1006, L. 16.)  
After Rachael filed for divorce, Robert Bogden, a friend of Capone’s, became 
concerned that Capone would do something dangerous.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1079, L. 
8 – p. 1080, L. 8.) 
After Rachael left Capone, Rachael started receiving strange calls 
multiple times a day.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 847, L. 8 – p. 856, L. 6; 9/3/14, p. 978, L. 15 
– p. 979, L. 4, Tr., p. 1009, L. 17 – p. 1010, L. 3; Ex. 4.)  The voice on the phone 
calls was artificially distorted.  (Id.)  Rachael played some of the harassing phone 
 2 
messages to her younger sister, Kristina Bonefield.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 965, L. 1 – p. 
966, L. 15, 9/3/14 Tr., p. 972, L. 14 – p. 974, L. 3; Exs. 4, 149.)  Ms. Bonefield 
described the voice on the phone messages as: 
Distorted, like not a human voice, like something from a movie 
almost, like scary.  Like, it scared me.  I didn’t – I told her I didn’t 
want to hear it anymore; that it had scared me, like – not like you or 
I would talk, like distorted, you know, an evil voice.  
 
(9/2/14 Tr., p. 965, Ls. 3-10.)  The calls were made using a service called 
“Spoof.com” which could change the voice of the caller and hide the phone 
number of the caller.  (See 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 21.)   
Rachael also received anonymous emails with pictures of mutilated 
bodies from old unsolved murder cases.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1057, L. 12 – p. 1058, L. 
6.)  She began to sleep with the lights on and started keeping a loaded gun in 
her house.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 855, L. 23 – p. 857, L. 19.)   
Rachael’s car, a white Dodge, was repeatedly vandalized.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 
910, L. 10 – p. 911, L. 23, p. 914, Ls. 15-25, p. 936, L. 25 – p. 939, L. 23; 9/3/14 
Tr., p. 976, L. 22 – p. 978, L. 1; Ex. 29.)  Her car tire was slashed, her oil filter 
loosened, and the back window broken out.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 910, L. 10 – p. 911, L. 
23, p. 941, L. 12 – p. 942, L. 10; 9/3/14 Tr., p. 1010, L. 4 – p. 1013, L. 1.)  For a 
time, Rachael was not sure who was stalking and harassing her.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 
1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 3.)  Captain Hally of the Asotin County Sheriff’s Office 
met with Rachael on April 13, 2010.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1170, Ls. 10-18.)   Rachael 
was “scared, frightened, upset and very concerned for her safety.”  (Id.)   
Capone owned and operated a car repair shop called Palouse Multiple 
Services or “PMS” in Moscow, Idaho.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1180, L. 5 – p. 1181, L. 11; 
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Ex. 29.)  After Rachael’s car was vandalized she took it to Capone’s auto shop to 
get it fixed.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1064, L. 22 – p. 1065, L. 18.)  Capone lent Rachael a 
white Yukon to drive while her car was being fixed.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1097, L. 25 – 
p. 1100, L. 3, p. 1122, Ls. 6-20, p. 1191, Ls. 5-10.)  The white Yukon belonged to 
Mr. Bogden.  (Id.)   
When Rachael told her friend, J.D. Rogers, that she was taking her car to 
Capone’s shop to get it repaired, he told Rachael that she should not go by 
herself.  (9/3/14 Tr. p. 1063, L. 20 – p. 1066, L. 11.)   
That week, Capone told Rachael that she had three days to decide 
whether to stay married to him or get divorced.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1017, L. 20 – p. 
1019, L. 6.)  Capone wanted to meet with Rachael again on Friday, April 16, 
2010, so she could give him her final answer.  (Id.)   
On April 16, 2010 Rachael went to Capone’s car shop.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 
1189, L. 4 – p. 1191, L. 4.)  When Rachael arrived, she was upset that her car 
was not yet fixed.  (Id.)  Rachael then left Capone’s shop to buy a computer at 
Office Depot.  (Id.)  Capone gave her his debit card to use.  (Id.)  Rachael went 
into Office Depot a little after 6:00 p.m., stayed 20-30 minutes, but left with a 
computer.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1261, L. 11 – p. 1264, L. 25, p. 1269, Ls. 11-21.)   
Rachael then stopped by the Third Street Market and purchased a pack of 
Grolsch beer using Capone’s debit card.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1191, L. 14 – p. 1193, L. 
25; Ex. 10.)  The receipt showed the purchase occurred at 7:07 p.m.  (9/8/14 Tr., 
p. 1615, L. 7 – p. 1619, L. 1; Ex. 136.)  She then returned to Capone’s shop.  
(9/4/14 Tr., p. 1191, L. 14 – p. 1193, L. 25; Ex. 10.)   
 4 
David Stone, an old friend of Capone’s, was at Capone’s shop because 
Capone was going to work on Mr. Stone’s car, a Dodge Durango.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 
1742, L. 5 – p. 1743, L. 22, p. 1759, Ls. 7-22.)  When Rachael returned to 
Capone’s shop, Capone drank some of the beer Rachael had purchased.  
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1773, L. 16 – p. 1775, L. 11.)  Later in the evening, Capone 
finished working on Rachael’s car.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1775, L. 18 – p. 1778, L. 20.)  
Capone pulled Rachael’s car out of the garage, and Mr. Stone had to drive his 
car around and back into Capone’s shop.  (Id.)   
After Mr. Stone pulled his car into Capone’s shop, Mr. Stone heard a 
noise, like a thud or a bang.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1778, L. 21 – p. 1782, L. 9.)  Mr. 
Stone walked around to see what was taking so long and he saw Rachael on the 
ground and Capone straddling and strangling her.  (Id.)  Rachael was not 
moving.  (Id.)  There was no sound.  (Id.)  Capone was wearing black shop 
gloves.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1782, L. 12 – p. 1784, L. 1.)   
Capone did not hear Mr. Stone walk up, so when Mr. Stone asked him 
what was going on, it startled Capone.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1782, Ls. 10-25.)  Capone 
told Mr. Stone that they were in this together and told him he knew where his 
family lived.  (Id.)  Capone and Mr. Stone opened the back of Mr. Stone’s 
Durango, put the seats down, and laid down cardboard in the back.  (9/9/14 Tr., 
p. 1788, L. 20 – p. 1791, L. 19.)  They then put Rachael’s body on top of the 
cardboard in the Durango and put some more cardboard and bags on top of her.  
(Id.)  After they closed the hatch to the Durango, Capone cleaned out the Yukon 
that Rachael had been driving. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1793, L. 20 – p. 1795, L. 7.)  
 5 
Capone was still wearing the gloves.  (Id.)  Capone then took up Rachael’s purse 
off the ground and put it in the Yukon.  (Id.)  Capone locked the shop and told 
Mr. Stone to follow him.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1797, L. 22 – p. 1801, L. 1; Exs. 21-23, 
127A.) Capone drove the Yukon to the Dyna Mart and parked it in back of the 
Dyna Mart.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1797, L. 22 – p. 1801, L. 1; Exs. 21-23, 127A.)  On the 
way back to Capone’s shop, Capone was quiet, but he told Mr. Stone that 
everything was going to be okay if he kept his mouth shut.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1801, 
L. 23 – p. 1803, L. 17.)  Capone instructed Mr. Stone to get a chain.  (9/9/14 Tr., 
p. 1803, L. 18 – p. 1804, L. 24.)   
Mr. Stone eventually obtained a chain and took it back to Capone’s shop, 
where Capone had laid a tarp on the floor near the rear of the Durango.  (9/9/14 
Tr., p. 1804, L. 25 – p. 1817, L. 16; Exs. 121-124, 139.)  Capone got one of the 
tarps down from the loft.  (Id.)  They wrapped Rachael in the tarp and tied it with 
the chain and a nylon-like rope.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1817, L. 23 – p. 1821, L. 6.)   
After Rachael’s body was secured in the tarp, Capone and Mr. Stone 
placed her in the back of the Durango, covered her up, and closed the hatch.  
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1821, L. 22 – p. 1822, L. 4.)  They drove to Red Wolf Bridge and 
eventually threw her over the side of the bridge into the river.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 
1822, L. 5 – p. 1829, L. 14; Exs. 113, 141.)   
When they were finished cleaning the Durango and the shop, Capone told 
Mr. Stone to meet him at Shari’s restaurant for breakfast in the morning.  (9/9/14 
Tr., p. 1837, L. 1 – p. 1838, L. 8.)  At breakfast, Capone reminded Mr. Stone to 
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keep his mouth shut, and told him that if he kept his mouth shut nobody else 
needed to get hurt.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1838, L. 9 – p. 1840, L. 2; Ex. 150.)   
Rachael did not show up to work on Saturday or Monday and, over the 
course of Monday, it became clear that she was missing.  (See 9/2/14 Tr., p. 
868, L. 14 – p. 869, L. 17; 9/2/14 Tr., p. 918, Ls. 3-21; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1175, Ls. 9-
20.)  When Captain Hally learned that Rachael was missing he became very 
concerned because of their prior conversations.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1175, L. 11 – p. 
1179, L. 3.)  Captain Hally contacted AT&T, Rachael’s cell phone service 
provider, and requested an exigent circumstances ping of her cell phone.  (Id.)  
The ping location came back in Nez Perce County, in an area off of Warner 
Road and Lindsay Creek Road.  (Id.)  The police were unsuccessful in finding 
Rachael or her cell phone.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1179, Ls. 4-15.)   
The next day, Tuesday, Ms. Bonefield asked Capone when he last saw 
Rachael and Capone said she had come by on Friday, April 16, bought some 
beer with his debit card, and then “ran off with some guy named Vince.”  (9/3/14 
Tr., p. 987, L. 7 – p. 989, L. 3.)  There was no “guy named Vince.”  (Id.)   
That same day, Captain Hally interviewed Capone at his car repair shop.  
Capone admitted that he had been stalking and harassing Rachael, and  
admitted that he had used Spoof.com to change his voice and hide his phone 
number.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 21.)  Capone also admitted to 
having a physical altercation with Rachael on December 27, 2009.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 
1187, L. 9 – p. 1188, L. 14.)  Capone further admitted Rachael had been at his 
shop on April 16.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1189, L. 9 – p. 1195, L. 7.)  He gave a couple of 
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different times that she left his shop, but eventually settled on the story that she 
left around 7:00 p.m.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1194, L. 20 – p. 1195, L. 7.)  According to 
Capone, Rachael left his shop and went to another computer store, Crazy 
Computers, but did not return after that.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1195, Ls. 8-22.)  Capone 
never mentioned Mr. Stone being present at his shop on April 16.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 
1196, L. 13 – p. 1197, L. 14.)   
Capone told the police they could search his shop and his pickup.  (9/4/14 
Tr., p. 1203, L. 22 – p. 1205, L. 4.)  Lieutenant Fry found a box of black latex 
gloves in Capone’s pickup.  (Id.)  While the police were at his shop, Capone 
became agitated and said something along the lines of “it wasn’t supposed to 
turn out like this” and then told the police to leave.  (Id.)   
The next day, Wednesday, April 21, 2010, Rachael’s family and friends 
were putting up missing person posters when they saw the white Yukon that 
Rachael had been driving, parked behind the Dyna Mart.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 878, L. 1 
– p. 880, L. 5.)  Rachael also made it a habit to hide her purse in her car, so Ms. 
Griswold was surprised to see Rachael’s purse sitting in the open in the Yukon.  
(9/2/14 Tr., p. 880, L. 9 – p. 881, L. 2; Ex. 17.) 
Rachael’s family continually searched for Rachael, but Capone never 
helped.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 954, Ls. 8-17; 9/3/14 Tr., p. 987, L. 7 – p. 989, L. 3, p. 
1114, Ls. 3-21, p. 1139, Ls. 13-18; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1239, Ls. 7-15.)   
On May 6, 2010, Capone was arrested on federal gun charges.  (9/8/14 
Tr., p. 1655, Ls. 5-12.)  While he was in custody he made several incriminating 
admissions regarding Rachael to his cellmates, Mr. Glass and Mr. Voss.  (See 
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e.g. 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1427, L. 23 – p. 1432, L. 20, p. 1442, L. 14 – p. 1444, L. 4, p. 
1457, Ls. 2-6, p. 1459, L. 21 – p. 1460, L. 13.)   
On May 1, 2013, after an investigation, the state charged Capone with 
first degree murder and related charges.   (See R., pp. 128-133, 241-247.)  Mr. 
Stone was also charged.  (See R., pp. 304-307.)  After a joint preliminary 
hearing, while the deputies were removing handcuffs and leg irons, Capone 
turned to Mr. Stone and said, “I don’t even know why you’re in here.”  (9/9/14 Tr., 
p. 1853, L. 21 – p. 1859, L. 6; 9/11/14 Tr., p. 2287, L. 20 – p. 2289, L. 22.)  Mr. 
Stone became emotional and eventually asked to speak to his attorney.  (See 
9/9/14 Tr., p. 1853, L. 21 – p. 1859, L. 12.)  Mr. Stone told his attorney that he 
needed to do the right thing.  (Id.)  There was no plea deal offered by the state 
the first time he spoke to investigators.  (Id)  Eventually, Mr. Stone entered into a 
plea agreement with the state in which Mr. Stone agreed to plead guilty to failure 
to notify law enforcement or coroner of death, and the remaining counts against 
him were dismissed without prejudice.  (R., pp. 442-445.)   
The district court granted the state leave to amend the Information based 
upon the evidence provided by Mr. Stone.  (R., pp. 439-445, 448-449).  The 
amended Information charged Capone with first degree murder, failure to notify 
coroner or law enforcement of death, conspiracy to commit failure to notify 
coroner or law enforcement of death and the persistent violator enhancement.  
(R., pp. 450-455, 1620-1622, 1642-1647.)   
The state filed a Notice of Intent to use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, including 
Capone’s harassment and stalking of Rachael, his vandalism of her car, his 
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attempted strangulation of Rachael, and his prior felony convictions and 
incarcerations.  (R., pp. 456-458.)  The state also filed a series of motions in 
limine.  (R., pp. 475-508.)  Capone filed a motion in limine to exclude the 
proposed I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (R., pp. 509-512.)   
The district court held a hearing on the pre-trial motions and entered a 
written order.  (R., pp. 1553-1556, 1571-1574.)  The district court deferred ruling 
on the admissibility of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence until trial.  (R., p. 1556 (“Court 
stated that the motions in limine in regard to the 404(b) evidence will have to be 
dealt with at trial.”).)   
 Prior to trial, both the state and Capone proposed jury instructions.  (R., 
pp. 1701-1735, 1750-1756.)  Capone did not propose a jury instruction regarding 
accomplice testimony, nor did Capone object to the lack of such an instruction.  
(See R., pp. 1750-1756.)  At trial, Capone did not object to the final jury 
instructions.  (R., pp. 1964, 1977 – 2019.)   
 Following a 16 day jury trial (R., pp. 1856-1858, 1861-1868, 1875-1889, 
1896-1905, 1912-1922, 1933-1944, 1948-1952, 1955-1970), the jury found 
Capone guilty of all charges.  (9/17/14 Tr., p. 2692, L. 24 – p. 2694, L. 8, p. 
2705, L. 19 – p. 2706, L. 5; R., pp. 2020-2022.)   
The district court imposed a fixed life sentence for first degree murder, 
and 20 years fixed for both failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death 
and conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death, 
which are to be served consecutively to each other, but concurrently to the 
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murder sentence.  (R., pp. 2091-2095.)  Capone filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  
(R., pp. 2096-2098.)   
While his appeal was pending Capone filed a Motion for New Trial, based 
upon a report by Deputy Demyer in which he reported that he obtained a 
statement from a Tyler Beyer who was being booked into jail with a .20 BAC.  
(See Jan. 7, 2016 Motion for New Trial1; Aug. R., pp. 1-7.)  Reportedly, in July of 
2013, Mr. Stone told Mr. Beyer that “they” would “never find [Rachael’s] body in 
the river because it was not there.”  (Id.)  
The district court denied Capone’s motion for a new trial, finding that the 
statement purportedly made by Mr. Stone to Mr. Beyer was not material and 
would have been admissible only for the purposes of impeachment.  (Aug. R., 
pp. 29-35.)  Further, this statement would not have provided sufficient evidence 
to change the jury verdict.  (Id.)  The district court found, “There was substantial 
evidence presented to the jury which supported the finding of guilt in this matter.”  
(Id.)   
 
                                            
1 The December 13, 2016 Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record, 
augmented the record with: 1. Motion for New Trial, file-stamped January 7, 
2016; 2. Memorandum of Authorities in Support of a Motion for New Trial, with 
attachment, file-stamped January 7, 2016; 3. State’s Response to “Motion for a 
New Trial,” with attachments, file-stamped January 21, 2016; and 4. Opinion and 
Order on Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial, file-stamped May 10, 2016.   
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ISSUES 
 
Capone states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. WHETHER THE GUILTY VERDICTS WERE SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICENT EVIDENCE AND WHETHER THE ACCOMPLICE 
TESTIMONY WAS CORROBORATED 
II. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE REQUIREMENT THAT ACCOMPLICE 
TESTIMONY MUST BE CORROBORATED 
III. WHETHER THE 404(B) EVIDENCE WAS IMPROPERLY 
ADMITTED 
IV. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO 
ALLOW TWO DIFFERENT STATE’S WITNESSES TO BE 
IMPEACHED WITH THEIR BURGLARLY CONVICTIONS THAT 
WERE LESS THAN 10 YEARS OLD  
V. WHETHER REVERSAL IS REQUIRED TO CUMULATIVE ERROR 
VI. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
 1. Has Capone failed to show that Mr. Stone was an accomplice to 
murder in the first degree and has Capone failed to show the jury lacked 
sufficient evidence to convict?   
 
 2. Has Capone failed to show the district court committed 
fundamental error by not instructing the jury regarding the corroboration 
requirement for accomplice testimony?   
 
 3. Did Capone fail to preserve for appeal his challenges to evidence 
that was admitted at trial without objection; and has Capone otherwise failed to 
show the district court abused its discretion when it admitted certain evidence 
over Capone’s evidentiary objections?   
 
 4. Has Capone failed to show the district court abused its discretion 
when it excluded evidence of two witnesses’ prior felony convictions?   
 
 5. Has Capone failed to show error, much less cumulative error?   
 
 6. Has Capone failed to show the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion for a new trial?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
The Jury Had More Than Sufficient Evidence To Convict Capone Of The 
Charged Crimes  
 
A. Introduction 
 Capone argues that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to convict 
him of any of the charges because Mr. Stone was an accomplice whose 
testimony was uncorroborated.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-19.)  Contrary to 
Capone’s assertion on appeal, Mr. Stone was not an accomplice to murder, 
because his mere presence during the commission of the crime was insufficient 
to make him an accomplice.  Further, even assuming Mr. Stone was an 
accomplice, the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate Mr. Stone’s 
testimony and establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential elements of 
all the charged crimes.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.”  
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 376, 382, 195 P.3d 737, 741 (Ct. App. 2008).  “A 
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on 
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the 
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (citing State v. 
Horejs, 143 Idaho 260, 263, 141 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. 
Herrera–Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State 
v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 572, 826 P.2d 919, 921 (Ct. App. 1992)).  
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The appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Id. (citations omitted)).  
Further, the appellate court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 
C. Mr. Stone Was Not An Accomplice To First Degree Murder 
 
On appeal, Capone assumes that Mr. Stone was an accomplice to all 
three felonies.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-19.)  Based upon this assumption, 
Capone argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of all three crimes 
because, Capone claims, there was no corroboration for the accomplice’s 
testimony as required by Idaho Code § 19-2117.  (See id.) 
Capone has failed to show that the state was required to present evidence 
to corroborate Mr. Stone’s testimony implicating Capone in the murder charge.  
A review of the record and the applicable law shows Mr. Stone was not an 
accomplice to that crime.  Idaho Code § 19-2117 states:  
A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, 
unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and 
without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect 
the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the 
corroboration is not sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of 
the offense, or the circumstances thereof. 
 
I.C. § 19-2117. 
 
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 313 defines an accomplice as someone 
who promotes or assists in the commission of a crime: 
An accomplice is a person who intends to promote or assist in the 
commission of a crime and who either directly commits the acts 
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constituting the crime or who, before or during its commission, aids, 
assists, facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits, 
invites, helps or hires another to commit the crime.  Mere presence 
at, acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the planning or 
commission of a crime is not in the absence of a duty to act 
sufficient to make one an accomplice. 
 
ICJI 313 (brackets omitted); see also State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 484, 974 
P.2d 1109, 1113 (Ct. App. 1999); I.C. § 19-1430 (“all persons concerned in the 
commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the 
offense, or aid and abet in its commission” are principals).  “A bystander’s mere 
acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the commission of an offense, however 
reprehensible the crime may be, is not sufficient to make that person an 
accomplice.”  State v. Ruiz, 115 Idaho 12, 17, 764 P.2d 89, 94 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(citing State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 655 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1982); State v. 
Adair, 99 Idaho 703, 587 P.2d 1238 (1978)); see also ICJI 313.  Being indicted in 
the same case is also not enough to make someone an accomplice.  See State 
v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 452, 872 P.2d 708, 715 (1994).   
Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, it is clear Mr. Stone 
was not an accomplice to Rachael’s murder.  Mr. Stone saw Capone strangling 
Rachael, but did not in any way promote, encourage or assist Capone in killing 
her.  (See 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1778, L. 21 – p. 1782, L. 25.)  Mr. Stone was merely a 
bystander which is insufficient to render him an accomplice.  Compare State v. 
Ruiz, 115 Idaho at 17, 764 P.2d at 94 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding presence during 
the crime and moving a vehicle fell short of establishing accomplice liability).  
While Mr. Stone’s apparent acquiescence to Rachael’s murder is reprehensible, 
it does not make him an accomplice to murder.   
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That Mr. Stone assisted with disposing of Rachael’s body and failed to 
report her death also does not make him an accomplice to murder.  (See, e.g., 
9/9/14 Tr., p. 1821, L. 22 – p. 1829, L. 14, p. 1850, L. 16 – p. 1871, L. 16; Exs. 
113, 141.)  A person who knows a felony was committed and willfully conceals it 
from the police can be an accessory.  See ICJI 310.  It is well established, 
however, that “[a]n accessory after the fact is not an accomplice.”  State v. 
Grimmett, 33 Idaho 203, 193 P. 380, 382-83 (1920); see also State v. McCabe, 
101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980); State v. Murphy, 94 Idaho 849, 
851, 499 P.2d 548, 550 (1972).  The testimony of an accessory after the fact is 
not accomplice testimony and does not require corroboration.  See McCabe, 101 
Idaho at 729, 620 P.2d at 302.  Since Mr. Stone was not an accomplice to first 
degree murder the corroboration requirements of Idaho Code § 19-2117 are not 
applicable to Capone’s conviction for first degree murder. 
 
D. Even If Mr. Stone Was An Accomplice To First Degree Murder, There 
Was Corroboration By Other Evidence Which Tended To Connect 
Capone With The Commission Of That Crime 
 
Mr. Stone was not an accomplice to first degree murder.  Even if he was 
an accomplice the state presented corroborating evidence sufficient to satisfy 
Idaho Code § 19-2117.  On appeal, Capone cites to the closing arguments of 
counsel to argue there was insufficient evidence to convict him.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, p. 11.)  Capone’s argument is primarily a request for the appellate court to 
reweigh the testimony presented to the jury.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-18.)  
Contrary to Capone’s argument on appeal, the jury had sufficient evidence and 
more than enough corroboration.   
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Corroborating evidence need not be sufficient to sustain a conviction on 
its own, nor must the evidence corroborate every detail of the accomplice’s 
testimony.  State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 630, 97 P.3d 1014, 1019 (2004) (citing 
State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 364, 690 P.2d 293, 299 (1984); State v. 
Campbell, 114 Idaho 367, 370, 757 P.2d 230, 233 (Ct. App. 1988); Matthews v. 
State, 136 Idaho 46, 50, 28 P.3d 387, 391 (Ct. App. 2001)).  “Corroboration of an 
accomplice need only connect the accused with the crime, it may be slight, and 
need only go to one material fact or it may be entirely circumstantial.”  State v. 
Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 486, 873 P.2d 122, 131 (1994) (citing Aragon, 107 Idaho 
at 364, 690 P.2d at 299; State v. Mundell, 66 Idaho 339, 158 P.2d 799 (1945)).  
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony.  
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 376, 382-383, 195 P.3d 737, 741-742 (Ct. App. 
2008).   
Statements attributable to the defendant may serve as the necessary 
corroboration.  State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 892, 216 P.3d 648, 650 (Ct. App. 
2009) (citing Mitchell, 146 Idaho at 382-383, 195 P.3d at 741-742).  “Even a 
highly plausible innocent explanation of the evidence ‘does not strip the evidence 
of its corroborative character.’”  Id. at 893, 216 P.3d at 651 (citing Hill, 140 Idaho 
at 630, 97 P.3d at 1019). 
There was corroborating evidence connecting Capone to the crime, 
including statements made by Capone.  Mr. Voss testified that Capone told him 
that Rachael had gone away before and then come back, but this time she was 
not coming back.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1427, L. 23 – p. 1431, L. 6.)  Capone also told 
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Mr. Voss that he would not be convicted for Rachael’s murder because “they” will 
never find her body.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1442, L. 14 – p. 1444, L. 4.)   
Mr. Glass testified that Capone told him that Rachael “ain’t doing nothing 
but pushing up daisies.”  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1455, L. 20 – p. 1456, L. 12.)  Capone 
also told Mr. Glass that Rachael was a “bitch” and “they would never find the 
body.”  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1457, Ls. 2-6.)  Mr. Glass also testified that Capone said, “I 
buried the fuckin’ bitch so deep they’ll never find her,” and told him several 
different versions about the last time he saw Rachael.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1460, Ls. 
1-8, p. 1466, Ls. 17-25.)  Capone also told Mr. Glass that Rachael might turn him 
in for having guns, and he could go to prison.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1467, Ls. 1-11.)  
Capone said that Rachael was a “bitch” and that “he’d end it all before he’d lose 
everything again.”  (Id.) 
Chelsea Dahl testified that, about a week before Rachael disappeared, 
Capone was very upset because Rachael missed a marriage counseling 
session.  (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1568, L. 9 – p. 1569, L. 11.)  Capone told Ms. Dahl that 
Rachael did not “know who she fucked with because I can make people 
disappear.”  (Id.) 
Captain Hally testified that Capone admitted to stalking and harassing 
Rachael.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 21.)  Capone admitted he used 
Spoof.com to change his voice and hide his phone number.  (Id.)  When the 
detectives approached Capone at his shop, shortly after Rachael went missing, 
Capone became emotional and said something along the lines of “it wasn’t 
supposed to happen like this.”  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1236, L. 5 – p. 1238, L. 6.)   
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Mr. Stone testified that Capone was wearing black gloves while he 
strangled Rachael.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1782, L. 12 – p. 1784, L. 1.)  Lieutenant Fry 
found a box of black gloves in Capone’s pickup, and a search of the Yukon that 
Rachael was driving uncovered a piece of a black glove in the passenger seat.  
(9/4/14 Tr., p. 1203, L. 22 – p. 1205, L. 4, p. 1327, Ls. 16-23, p. 1335, L. 8 – p. 
1338, L. 23; Exs. 98-100.)  Capone’s DNA was a major contributor on the 
outside glove tip, and Capone’s DNA was present at a higher amount than any 
other DNA.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1387, L. 18 – p. 1389, L. 15, p. 1389, L. 25 – p. 1390, 
L. 17.)   
Mr. Stone testified that, on the night of the murder, he stayed inside the 
shop while Capone went outside to speak with Rachael several times.  (9/8/14 
Tr., p. 1771, L. 21 – p. 1775, L. 11.)  Tim Fountain, who lived near Capone’s 
repair shop, testified he saw a woman and a man in a confrontation outside of 
Capone’s shop on April 16, 2010.  (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1696, L. 2 – p. 1706, L. 14; Exs. 
117-120.)  Both Mr. Stone and Mr. Fountain heard a loud noise from Capone’s 
shop that same evening.  (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1696, L. 2 – p. 1706, L. 14; 9/9/14 Tr., p. 
1778, L. 21 – p. 1782, L. 9.)     
After the murder, Capone took up Rachael’s purse off the ground and put 
it in the Yukon.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1793, L. 20 – p. 1795, L. 7.)   When the Yukon 
was found by the Dyna Mart, Rachael’s purse was sitting in plain view in the 
vehicle and where Rachael would never have left it.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 880, L. 9 – p. 
881, L. 2; 9/3/14 Tr., p. 990, Ls. 14-20; Ex. 17.)   
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Louis Soule testified that he saw Capone on the evening of Friday, April 
16, 2010, with the white Yukon that Rachael was previously driving. (9/8/14 Tr., 
p. 1673, L. 3 – p. 1681, L. 14, p. 1690, L. 3 – p. 1693, L. 18; Ex. 11.)  Capone 
was walking quickly and ignoring Mr. Soule, which was unusual.  (Id.)  
Cell phone tower data also corroborated Mr. Stone’s testimony.  Evidence 
from the cell phone towers used by Rachael’s cell phone throughout Friday, April 
16, 2010, showed her movements from Capone’s shop to the Office Depot in 
Moscow, to the store where she bought the Groslch beer, and then back to 
Capone’s shop.  (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2236, L. 14 – 2250, L. 2; Exs. 140.3 – 140.25.)  
The last voice phone call from Rachael’s phone was at 8:09 p.m. to Dennis 
Plunkett’s cell phone.  (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2244, L. 19 – p. 2246, L. 16; Exs. 140.20-
140.21.)  This call used the Paradise Ridge Tower in Moscow, Idaho.  (Id.)  The 
Paradise Ridge Tower is the tower closest to Capone’s shop.  (Id.)  Rachael’s 
phone also received a text message using that same tower at 8:27 p.m.  (Id.)   
Capone’s own cell phone records also corroborated Mr. Stone’s 
testimony.  (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2250, L. 3 – p. 2251, L. 6; Exs. 140.26-140.28.)  The 
records show that Capone’s cell phone was also using the Paradise Ridge 
Tower.  (Id.)  Capone’s cell phone logged 29 phone calls between 4:12 p.m. and 
7:30 p.m., on April 16, 2010, and during all 29 calls his cell phone used the 
Paradise Ridge Tower.  (Id.)  From 9:57 p.m. to 10:50 p.m., Capone’s cell phone 
also used the Paradise Ridge Tower.  (Id.)   
Further, records show that Mr. Stone’s cell phone also used the Paradise 
Ridge Tower throughout the day and evening of April 16, 2010, including phone 
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calls at 7:19 p.m. and 8:40 p.m.  (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2251, L. 7 – p. 2252, L. 15; Exs. 
140.29-140.32.)  In addition, the decrease in cell phone activities for Capone, 
Rachael and Mr. Stone’s cell phones corroborated Mr. Stone’s testimony. 
(9/11/14 Tr., p. 2253, L. 9 – p. 2254, L.1; Exs. 140.35-140.36.) 
Capone’s behavior after the murder also provides circumstantial evidence 
that supports Mr. Stone’s testimony.  After Rachael separated from him, Capone 
stayed with his friend, Mr. Bogden.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1075, L. 8 – p. 1077, L. 13.)  
Mr. Bogden’s wife, Carole Bogden, testified that Capone was not home by 
midnight on Friday, April 16, 2010, and she did not see him when she woke up at 
8:00 a.m. on Saturday.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1135, L. 24 – p. 1138, L. 9.)  She also 
testified that when she finally saw Capone on Saturday, he was acting unusual.  
(Id.)   
John Houser, the pastor at Capone’s church, testified that on the Sunday 
following the murder, Capone’s actions were “very unusual.”  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 
1150, L. 21 – p. 1153, L. 10.)  Capone wore sunglasses in church and he got up 
and left while Pastor Houser was teaching.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1151, L. 6 – p. 1153, 
L. 10.)   
Shortly after Rachael disappeared, Mr. Bogden asked Capone if he had 
anything to do with Rachael’s disappearance.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1110, L. 17, p. 
1111, L. 24.)  Capone did not answer.  (Id.)  Mr. Bogden explained that they 
were driving around for five hours talking and, during that long conversation, Mr. 
Bogden asked Capone a specific question: 
And so I went to – my advice to him was, well – I asked him 
specifically, if you have any – do you have anything to do with 
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Rachael’s disappearance?  And he didn’t – didn’t answer.  He said, 
that’s what my family asked.  And I said, no way.  But he didn’t 
answer me directly.  
 
(9/3/14 Tr., p. 1111, Ls. 8-13.)   
 
Finally, Rachael’s family was continually searching for Rachael, but 
Capone never helped look for her.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 954, Ls. 8-17; 9/3/14 Tr., p. 
987, L. 7 – p. 989, L. 3, p. 1114, Ls. 3-21, p. 1139, Ls. 13-18; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1239, 
Ls. 7-15.)   
While Mr. Stone was not an accomplice to first degree murder, there was 
evidence corroborating his testimony.  The jury had sufficient competent 
evidence to find Capone guilty of first degree murder.   
 
E. There Was Corroboration Of Mr. Stone’s Testimony Which Tended To 
Connect Capone To Failure To Report Death And Conspiracy To Commit 
Failure To Report Death Charges 
 
 Mr. Stone pled guilty to conspiring to fail to report Rachael’s death to the 
coroner or law enforcement.  (See R., pp. 442-445.)  Mr. Stone admitted aiding 
Capone in disposing of Rachael’s body and lying to help him cover it up.  While 
Mr. Stone was likely an accomplice to the failure to notify coroner or law 
enforcement of death, and conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law 
enforcement of death charges, there was substantial testimony corroborating his 
testimony regarding these charges.   
As noted above, corroboration accomplice testimony need only connect 
the accused with the crime, it may be slight, and need only go to one material 
fact or it may be entirely circumstantial.”  Jones, 125 Idaho at 486, 873 P.2d at 
131 (citations omitted).  In addition to the evidence and admissions by Capone 
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noted in section I.D. above, there is additional corroborating evidence connecting 
Capone to the failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death and 
conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death 
charges   
Mr. Stone testified that he and Capone wrapped Rachael’s body in a tarp.  
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1817, L. 23 – p. 1821, L. 6.)  Nathan Donner testified that he used 
to help Capone at his shop and he testified that the two tarps in the loft of 
Capone’s shop had overspray on them from paint.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1506, L. 2 – p. 
1507, L. 5, p. 1515, L. 11 – p. 1516, L. 11, p. 1531, Ls. 9-22; Ex. 61, 64.)  
However, after Rachael was murdered, and when the police took pictures of the 
tarps, one of the tarps was new and did not have paint on it.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1317, 
L. 15 – p. 1318, L. 11; Exs. 63-65.)   
Brian Spence testified that, in January 2007, Capone opened a charge 
account with Spence Hardware.  (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1631, L. 18 – p. 1633, L. 4.)  On 
the morning of Saturday, April 17, 2010, the day after the murder, Capone 
purchased a 12 x 20 green brown tarp and then asked to close his account.  
(9/8/14 Tr., p. 1633, L. 5 – p. 1639, L. 4; Ex. 114.)  The tarp Capone purchased 
looked like the new tarp the police found in Capone’s shop.  (Id.)   
Mr. Glass testified that, during a conversation he had with Capone, 
Capone said that if he was going to kill someone he would put them in a tarp and 
cut them so there would be no DNA evidence.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1457, L. 14 – p. 
1458, L. 5.)   
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Mr. Stone testified that, after the murder, Capone locked the shop and 
told Mr. Stone to follow him in Capone’s truck. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1797, L. 22 – p. 
1801, L. 1; Exs. 21-23, 127A.)  Capone drove the Yukon and parked it on the 
back side of the Dyna Mart.  (Id.)  Detective Sergeant Aston testified that he 
reviewed video footage taken from the Dyna Mart on April 16, 2010, and saw a 
truck similar to Capone’s truck drive eastbound on Highway 128 at approximately 
9:20 p.m.  (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2193, L. 3 – p. 2201, L. 14; Exs. 127A-D.)   
Alisa Anderson, Mr. Stone’s ex-wife, testified that Mr. Stone came home 
on the night of Friday, April 16, 2010, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., and he was 
driving Capone’s pickup.  (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2125, L. 19 – p. 2130, L. 25.)  She also 
testified that he then left and did not come home until around 12:30 a.m.  (Id.)   
Mr. Stone also testified that he and Capone used the Durango to transport 
Rachael’s body.  (See 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1788, L. 20 – p. 1791, L. 19.)  The video 
footage taken from the Dyna Mart showed two vehicles that resembled the 
Durango driving on the highway at approximately 11:21 p.m. and 11:46 p.m. 
(9/11/14 Tr., p. 2201, L. 15 – p. 2214, L. 10; Exs. 128-131, 132A-B, 133A-B.) 
Mr. Stone testified that Capone drove the Yukon to the Dyna Mart.  
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1797, L. 22 – p. 1801, L. 1; Exs. 21-23, 127A.)  Deborah Stamper, 
who worked at the Dyna Mart did not see the Yukon when she went to work at 
11:00 p.m.  (9/15/14 Tr., p. 2504, L. 13 – p. 2507, L. 16.)  However, on April 21, 
2010, the Yukon was found parked near the Dyna Mart.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 878, L. 1 
– p. 880, L. 5.)  The police also found a piece of paper with Rachael’s blood on it 
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on the floorboard of the Yukon tucked underneath the front passenger seat.  
(9/4/14 Tr., p. 1338, L. 24 – p. 1341, L. 6; Exs. 101, 102A, 102B.)   
Detective Mooney testified that the police examined the position of the 
driver’s seat in the Yukon.  (Id.)  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1343, L. 6 – p. 1346, L. 4; Exs. 
105-108.)  Rachael was 5’4” tall.  (Id.)  Detective Mooney got another 5’4” female 
to sit in the Yukon’s driver’s seat and determined that a woman of Rachael’s 
height could not comfortably drive the Yukon with the driver’s seat in the position 
it was found.  (Id.)  Capone is 5’10” tall.  (Id.)  The driver’s seat was in a much 
better position for a 5’10” male than it was for the 5’4” female.  (Id.)   
Mr. Stone also testified that Capone instructed him to get a chain.  (9/9/14 
Tr., p. 1801, L. 23 – p. 1803, L. 17.)  Mr. Stone went to his place of work, the City 
of Moscow, and got a long chain from a scrap iron pile.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1806, L. 8 
– p. 1816, L. 13; Exs. 121-124, 139.)  Capone and Mr. Stone used that chain to 
help wrap Rachael’s body in the tarp.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1817, L. 23 – p. 1821, L. 6.)  
Rick Benjamin, a fleet supervisor with the City of Moscow, testified the city has a 
scrap iron pile where old tire chains are placed, and they do not take inventory of 
that scrap iron.  (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2115, L. 14 – p. 2117, L. 5.)   
The day after the murder, Mr. Stone and Capone met at Shari’s 
restaurant.  (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1838, L. 9 – p. 1840, L. 2.)  During this meal Capone 
reminded Mr. Stone to keep his mouth shut about Rachael’s death.  (Id.)  The 
state introduced into evidence a receipt showing that Mr. Stone paid for 
breakfast at Shari’s Restaurant at 11:11 a.m. Saturday, April 17, 2010. (Ex. 150.)   
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In addition, there was corroborating evidence that neither Capone nor Mr. 
Stone reported Rachael’s death to law enforcement or the coroner.  Latah 
County Coroner Catherine Mabbutt testified that neither Capone nor Mr. Stone 
reported Rachael’s death.  (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2285, L. 16 – p. 2286, L. 21.)  Neither 
Capone nor Mr. Stone made any reports to law enforcement that Rachael was 
dead.  (9/8/14 Tr., p. 1619, Ls. 2-10, p. 1655, Ls. 18-22.)  Further, Rachael’s 
family was continually searching for Rachael, but Capone never helped look for 
her.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1114, Ls. 3-21, p. 1139, Ls. 13-18; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1239, Ls. 7-
15.)   
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, there is more 
than the slight and circumstantial evidence necessary to corroborate Mr. Stone’s 
accomplice testimony.  Capone has failed to show the jury did not have sufficient 
evidence to convict him of the charged crimes. 
 
II. 
The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error When It Did Not Instruct 
The Jury Regarding Accomplice Corroboration 
 
A. Introduction 
Capone did not request, or object to the lack of, a jury instruction 
regarding accomplice testimony corroboration at trial.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 
10.)  On appeal, Capone argues the lack of such a jury instruction is 
fundamental error.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)  Capone’s argument fails 
all three prongs of the fundamental error test.   
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First, corroboration of accomplice testimony is a statutory requirement, not 
a constitutional right.  Second, the alleged error was not clear from the record 
because it is not clear Mr. Stone was an accomplice to first degree murder.  
Third, even if it was error to not give the instruction, the error was harmless 
because there was evidence that corroborated Mr. Stone’s testimony.  Capone 
has failed to show fundamental error.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
When a party fails to object to the jury instructions the appellate court 
reviews the instructions for fundamental error.  State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 
588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011).  Fundamental error is an error that “so 
profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the 
accused of his fundamental right to due process.”  State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 
844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992).  In order to constitute fundamental error the 
defendant must show that the error: “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information 
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).  
 
C. Capone Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental 
Error By Not Instructing The Jury Regarding The Statutory Requirement 
That Accomplice Testimony Be Corroborated 
 
Capone did not object to the lack of a jury instruction regarding 
accomplice testimony corroboration.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  On appeal, 
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Capone argues the lack of jury instruction amounted to fundamental error.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-18.)  Capone’s argument fails all three prongs of the 
fundamental error test.   
1. Capone Has Failed To Establish The Lack Of An Instruction On 
Accomplice Corroboration Violated An Unwaived Constitutional 
Right  
 
 The requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated is not a 
constitutional right.  Rather, the requirement for corroboration of accomplice 
testimony stems from Idaho Code § 19-2117, a statute.  Fundamental error only 
applies to unwaived constitutional rights; a defendant cannot satisfy the first 
prong of the fundamental error test by alleging a violation of a statutory right.  
See State v. Moore, 158 Idaho 943, 947, 354 P.3d 505, 509 (Ct. App. 2015).  
Unobjected to jury instructions can be subject to fundamental error review if the 
jury instructions violate due process by failing to require the state to prove every 
element of the charged offense.  State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 444, 224 P.3d 
509, 511 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).)  Here, Capone does not argue, nor 
could he show, that accomplice corroboration is a necessary element of the 
crimes for which he was convicted.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-18.)  Because 
corroboration of accomplice testimony is a statutory right, not a constitutional 
right, Capone’s unpreserved claim of instructional error fails the first prong of the 
Perry fundamental error analysis.   
  
2. Capone Has Failed To Establish It Was Clear Error To Not Instruct 
The Jury Regarding The Requirement For Corroboration Of 
Accomplice Testimony 
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 Even if Capone had an unwaived constitutional right to a jury instruction 
based upon a statute, the error is not clear from the record.  First, it is not clear 
from the record that Mr. Stone was an accomplice to murder.  (See § I.D., supra)  
Therefore, there is no clear error regarding the failure to instruct on the 
accomplice testimony corroboration requirement in relation to the murder charge.   
It is also not clear from the record that trial counsel’s failure to request, or 
object to a lack of, a jury instruction on corroboration of accomplice testimony 
was not a tactical decision.  An error plainly exists if the error is clear from the 
record and there is not any need for additional information, including information 
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision.  See Perry, 150 Idaho 
at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.   
It appears that part of Capone’s trial strategy was to persuade the jury that 
Mr. Stone was lying about everything, including that a murder even occurred and 
that there was a cover up of this murder.  Capone’s trial counsel spent a great 
deal of time on cross-examination questioning Mr. Stone’s credibility.  (9/9/14 Tr., 
p. 1872, L. 23 – p. 1920, L. 25; 9/10/14 Tr., p. 1925, L. 3 – p. 2093, L 4.)  
Capone’s trial counsel repeatedly questioned Mr. Stone’s actions and words 
after the murder to cast doubt on whether he actually witnessed Capone murder 
Rachael at all.   (See e.g. 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1890, Ls. 8-11; 9/10/14 Tr., p. 1931, Ls. 
11-19.)  
Under the theory that Mr. Stone was lying about the existence of a 
murder, there was no crime for which Mr. Stone and Capone would be 
accomplices.  The pattern accomplice corroboration jury instruction either would 
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have instructed the jury that Mr. Stone was an accomplice as a matter of law, or 
would have required the jury to determine whether Mr. Stone was an accomplice.  
See ICJI 313.  If the district court had instructed the jury that Mr. Stone and 
Capone were accomplices, or that they could be accomplices, such could have 
undermined the defense’s strategy because the instruction carries an underlying 
assumption that there was a crime committed for which Mr. Stone could be an 
accomplice.  If Capone committed no crime, as was the defense’s theory, there 
was no need for the accomplice corroboration jury instruction.   
Further, the accomplice corroboration jury instruction would not have 
provided much benefit to Capone.  The pattern instruction states that the 
corroborating evidence need only be “slight” and need only “tend[] to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the crime.”  See ICJI 313.  As noted above, 
there was more than enough corroborating evidence presented to the jury.  If the 
district court had given this jury instruction it could have undermined part of the 
defense’s strategy and would have provided minimal benefit to Capone’s 
defense.  Based upon this record, the decision to not request an accomplice 
corroboration jury instruction may have been a tactical decision, and, as such, 
the alleged error is not clear error and Capone fails the second prong of the 
fundamental error analysis.   
 
 3. Capone Has Failed To Establish Any Error Was Not Harmless 
 
 Even if it was error to not instruct the jury regarding the requirement that 
accomplice testimony be corroborated, the error was harmless.  An error in 
failing to give the jury an instruction regarding accomplice testimony may be 
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harmless if ample corroborative evidence was presented.  State v. Hill, 140 
Idaho 625, 630, 97 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Scroggins, 
110 Idaho 380, 385–86, 716 P.2d 1152, 1157–58 (1985)).  The corroborating 
evidence need only tend to connect the defendant to the crime and is sufficient 
even if it does not corroborate the accomplice’s version of the facts.  See 
Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 385–86, 716 P.2d at 1157–58 (“Hence, although 
[defendant’s] testimony did not corroborate [accomplice’s] version of the facts, it 
was sufficient to permit a finding that Scroggins was connected with the 
commission of the offense.”).   
Here, there was substantial corroborating evidence regarding first degree 
murder (see § I.D., supra) and both the failure to notify coroner or law 
enforcement of death, and conspiracy to commit failure to notify coroner or law 
enforcement of death (see § I.E. supra).  Capone cannot show there was any 
violation of an unwaived constitutional right, nor can he show that any error was 
clear from the record, and not harmless. 
 
III. 
Capone Failed To Object To Most Of The Purported I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence And 
The District Court Did Not Err In Overruling The Objections Capone Did Make 
 
A. Introduction 
The state filed a notice of intent to use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  (R., pp. 
456-458.)  Capone filed a motion in limine to exclude the proposed I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence. (R., pp. 509-512.)  The district court deferred ruling on the I.R.E. 
404(b) issues until trial.  (R., p. 1556.)  However, at trial, Capone objected to only 
some of the evidence he had previously moved to exclude.  (See 9/3/14 Tr., p. 
 31 
1002, L. 1 – p. 1006, L. 16, p. 1082, L. 7 – p. 1085, L. 4; 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1432, L. 
21 – p. 1433, L. 7).  The district court overruled those objections.  (See id.)   
On appeal, Capone argues that all of the purported I.R.E. 404(b) evidence 
he moved to exclude in his motion in limine should not have been admitted.  
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-29.)  Since the district court deferred ruling on the 
motion in limine until trial, Capone was required to make contemporaneous 
objections during trial to preserve the issues.  Because Capone failed to object to 
the admission of much of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence at trial, his challenge to the 
admission of that evidence is not properly before this Court.  As to the 
evidentiary issues he did preserve by way of specific objection before the trial 
court, Capone has failed to show error.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
When determining the admissibility of evidence to which an I.R.E. 404(b) 
objection has been made, the trial court must first determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence of the other acts that a reasonable jury could believe the 
conduct actually occurred.  I.R.E. 404(b).  If so, then the court must consider: (1) 
whether the other acts are relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning 
the crime charged, other than propensity; and (2) whether the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  See State v. Grist, 
147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2008). 
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C. Capone Only Preserved For Appeal The Admissibility Of I.R.E. 404(b) 
Evidence To Which He Specifically Objected At Trial   
 
On appeal, Capone argues that I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was improperly 
admitted.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-29.)  Capone’s argument on appeal 
assumes that the admissibility of all of this I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was objected 
to and therefore preserved for appeal.  (See id.)  This is incorrect.   
Prior to trial the state filed a notice of intent to introduce I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence.  (R., pp. 456-457.)  Capone filed a motion in limine to exclude the 
proposed I.R.E.  404(b) evidence, and the district court held a hearing on the 
defense’s motion in limine.  (R., pp. 509-512, 1553-1556.)  The district court 
deferred ruling on Capone’s motion.  (R., p. 1556.)   
 On appeal, Capone claims that at the April 9, 2014 hearing, the district 
court granted part of his motion in limine to exclude I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and 
precluded the state from presenting evidence of Capone’s May 6, 2010 arrest on 
gun charges.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-23.)  This claim is based on a 
misreading of the record.  The district court’s comments at the April 9, 2014 
hearing, on which Capone’s appellate argument rely, reference a different 
motion to suppress statements Capone made during his May 6, 2010 arrest.  
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-23; 4/9/14 Tr., p. 94, L. 4 – p. 95, L. 1; R., pp. 513-
592.)  At the April 9, 2014 hearing, the district court suppressed statements 
made by Capone on May 6, 2010.  (4/9/14 Tr., p. 94, Ls. 4-16.)  The district court 
then determined that it would take the other motions in limine under advisement.  
(4/9/14 Tr., p. 94, L. 17 – p. 95, L. 1.)   
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Now, to go back to the motion in limine with respect to the 404(b) 
evidence, some of that is going to have to be decided at trial.  
Obviously, the testimony around the Defendant’s arrest on May 6th 
will not be admitted based upon the Court’s prior ruling on the 
statements.  
 
As far as what the cellmates had to say, we’ll have to look at that at 
trial.  I’m going to think about the other issues on the motion in 
limine before deciding.  
 
(Id.)   
Contrary to Capone’s argument on appeal, this was not a ruling on 
Capone’s motion to exclude I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of his May 6, 2010 arrest.  
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 23.)  Read in context, the district court was stating that 
it’s prior ruling suppressing the statements made by Capone on May 6, 2010 
would still apply regardless of any I.R.E. 404(b) ruling.  The district court was not 
making a ruling under I.R.E. 404(b) excluding the fact of the May 6, 2010 arrest.    
This conclusion is supported by the district court’s subsequent written order and 
the court minutes of the April 9, 2014 hearing.  After the hearing, the district court 
issued a ruling on the pre-trial motions  (R., pp. 1571-1574.)  The written order 
included a written ruling suppressing Capone’s May 6, 2010 statements to 
police.  (R., p. 1573.)  The district court’s written order did not include any rulings 
on the motion to exclude the proposed I.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  (See R., pp. 
1571-1574.)  The Court minutes for the April 9, 2014 hearing, which were 
approved by the district court, reported, “Court stated that the motions in limine in 
regard to the 404(b) evidence will have to be dealt with at trial.”  (See R., p. 
1556.)  Therefore, contrary to Capone’s argument on appeal, the district court 
deferred ruling on Capone’s motion in limine to exclude all of the I.R.E. 404(b) 
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evidence until trial.  Because the district court reserved ruling on the motion in 
limine until trial, it remained incumbent on Capone to object to the evidence 
when it was offered at trial.  Where a district court defers ruling on a motion in 
limine, the moving party must continue to assert any objections to the evidence 
as it is offered.  See State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 699–700, 760 P.2d 27, 38–
39 (1988).     
 “Absent a prior judicial determination on admissibility, a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the court below before an issue is preserved for 
appeal.”  State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416, 418-419, 973 P.2d 768, 770-771 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (citations omitted).  Since the district court did not make a prior 
judicial determination on Capone’s motion to exclude the state’s proposed I.R.E. 
404(b) evidence, Capone was required to make proper and timely objections to 
preserve these evidentiary issues for appeal.2  Where Capone failed to do so, 
the evidentiary issue was not preserved for appeal.  This Court must therefore 
decline to address Capone’s challenges to the admissibility of any I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence to which he did not object at trial.    
 
                                            
2 The fundamental error analysis does not apply to the unobjected to testimony 
because fundamental error only applies to unwaived constitutional claims, not 
evidentiary issues.  See State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 182, 254 P.3d 77, 83 
(Ct. App. 2011).   
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D. Capone Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred In Admitting The 
Evidence To Which He Objected At Trial 
 
On appeal Capone addresses three instances where he made a 
contemporaneous objection at trial.  For the reasons set forth below, Capone 
has failed to show that the district court erred in admitting this evidence.     
1. The District Court Did Not Err In Permitting Mr. Bogden To Testify 
Regarding The Fact It Was Illegal For Capone To Possess A 
Firearm 
 
During the pre-trial hearing, the state explained the fact that Capone had 
a prior felony conviction was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) because it 
established part of Capone’s motive to murder Rachael.  (4/9/14 Tr., p. 55, L. 13 
– p. 59, L. 1.)  As a convicted felon, it was illegal for Capone to possess a 
firearm.  (Id.)  However, Capone was in possession of a firearm and he was 
afraid Rachael would turn him in for possessing the firearm.  (Id.)   
At trial, during Mr. Bogden’s testimony, and outside the presence of the 
jury, Capone argued his prior felony conviction was not relevant and not 
admissible under I.R.E. 404(b).  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1082, L. 7 – p. 1085, L. 4.)  The 
state responded by explaining that Mr. Bogden was going to testify that Capone 
could not have guns because of his prior felony conviction and Capone was 
concerned about Rachael reporting him for having a gun.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1083, 
Ls. 5-22.) 
The district court ruled that Capone’s prior felony conviction was relevant 
evidence of his motive to kill Rachael, but the district court instructed Mr. Bogden 
not to testify about the potential penalty for being a felon in possession of a 
firearm.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1083, L. 23 – p. 1084, L. 21.)  Mr. Bogden then testified 
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that Capone wanted to get rid of his gun because he could not legally possess it, 
and Rachael knew Capone could not legally own a gun.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1108, L. 
6 – p. 1109, L. 8.)   
On appeal Capone argues that his concern about Rachael turning him in 
for illegally possessing a firearm did not provide a motive for murder and there 
was insufficient evidence to support the state’s motive theory.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 27-28.)3  Capone claims the only evidence to support this motive came 
from Mr. Glass who testified that Capone said “he’d end it all before he’d lose 
everything again.”  (See Id. (citing 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1467, Ls. 10-11).)  Capone 
argues this statement shows Capone would kill himself and not Rachael if he 
were turned in for illegally possessing the firearm.  (See id.)  Capone’s argument 
is misplaced.   
Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted to 
prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
                                            
3 Capone includes a statement in the 404(b) section of his brief regarding Mr. 
Bogden’s state of mind testimony that he classifies as “strictly speaking not an 
[sic] 404(b) issue and rather another example of the court admitting irrelevant 
evidence[.]”  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-26.)  This “example” should not be 
considered on appeal because Capone failed to identify the admissibility of Mr. 
Bodgen’s state of mind testimony as an issue on appeal, and he has failed to 
provide argument or law to show how the district court erred in admitting this 
evidence.   See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) 
(quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting 
an issue will not be considered if “either authority or argument is lacking” and 
declining to consider appellant’s claim because he failed to “provide[] a single 
authority or legal proposition to support his argument”).  Even if it is considered 
on appeal, Mr. Bodgen’s testimony was relevant because, as Capone’s longtime 
friend, his testimony describing Capone’s strange behavior leading up to and 
after the murder and how that behavior was strange enough to affect Mr. 
Bogden’s state of mind and behavior refutes Capone’s theory and supports the 
state’s theory of the case.   
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absence of mistake or accident.  I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 
845 P.2d 1211 (1993).  The first tier, of the two-tiered analysis, involves a “two-
part inquiry:  (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad 
acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material 
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.”  State v. 
Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138, 267 P.3d 721, 725 (Ct. App. 2011).  (citing Grist, 
147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188).   
Here, the prior bad act was Capone’s prior felony conviction.  (See R., pp. 
456-457.)  The prior bad act was admitted to prove motive.  Using the two-tiered 
Grist analysis, the first part of the first tier required the district to determine 
whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that Capone was previously 
convicted of a felony.  This fact was undisputed.   However, on appeal Capone 
flips the Grist analysis on its head.  Capone appears to argue that the district 
court was required to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of the 
motive before the prior bad act could be admitted.  Under I.R.E. 404(b) it is the 
prior bad act that is used to prove motive – not the other way around.   
Even if Capone’s formulation of the Grist analysis is accepted – Mr. Glass’ 
testimony, contrary to Capone’s argument, actually supported the state’s theory 
of motive for the murder.  In context of Capone’s conversation with Mr. Glass, 
Capone’s statement, “end it all,” was directed towards Rachael, “the bitch,” and 
not himself.  (See 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1467, Ls. 1-11.)   
Q. Okay.  Did he – did you two ever have a discussion about 
his concern regarding being turned in for guns? 
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A. Yes.  He got worried that she might turn him in for guns 
because he was a convicted felon and he’d go to prison.  
 
Q. Did he make a comment to you regarding Rachael after he 
said that? 
 
A. Yeah.  You know, she’s a bitch, and he would never – he’d 
end it all before he’d lose everything again.  
 
(Id.)   
 
Capone has failed to show the district court erred when it overruled his 
objection to Mr. Bogden’s testimony and permitted evidence of his prior felony 
conviction to show motive to murder Rachael.   
 Even if it was error to admit evidence of Capone’s prior felony conviction 
through Mr. Bogden, the error was harmless because the same evidence was 
admitted through other witnesses without objection.  “Where a defendant alleges 
error at trial that he contemporaneously objected to, this Court reviews the error 
on appeal under the harmless error test.”  State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600-
01, 301 P.3d 242, 258-259 (2013) (citation omitted).  “[T]he error is harmless if 
the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error.”  Id. at 598, 
301 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted).  Mr. Glass’ testimony regarding Capone’s 
prior felony conviction came in without objection.  (See 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1467, Ls. 1-
11.)  Nor did Capone object to the testimony of Mr. Donner, who testified that 
Capone asked him to take a rifle because Capone was worried that Rachael or 
someone would turn him in for possessing it.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1514, L. 18 – p. 
1515, L. 6.)  Because Mr. Bodgen’s testimony that Capone had a prior felony 
conviction was merely cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection, 
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there is no reasonable possibility the alleged error contributed to Capone’s 
conviction.  
 
2. The District Court Did Not Err In Overruling Capone’s Relevance 
Objection To A Portion Of Mr. Voss’ Testimony  
 
Prior to trial, the state gave notice that it intended to offer evidence of 
Capone’s May 6, 2010 arrest on a federal gun charge, and the fact that Capone 
was incarcerated in various correctional facilities subsequent to his May 6, 2010 
arrest, because such evidence provided the foundation and context for both the 
statements Capone made to Detective Hally and for the multiple admissions 
Capone made to his cellmates. (R., pp. 456-457; 4/9/14 Tr., p. 59, L. 2 – p. 61, 
L. 23.)  At the April 9, 2014 hearing on his motion in limine to exclude the 
evidence, Capone objected to introducing the reasons for his incarceration.  (See 
4/9/14 Tr., p. 60, Ls. 14-21.)  Like the other issues, the district court did not rule 
on Capone’s motion in limine to exclude this evidence at the April 9, 2014 
hearing and instead reserved the ruling for trial.   
 On appeal, Capone points to three instances in which the fact Capone 
was arrested for a gun charge came up.  (see Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-24 (citing 
9/4/14 Tr., p. 1255, Ls. 16-18; 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433, L.3;4 9/9/14 
Tr., p. 1655, Ls. 5-7.)  However, Capone did not object to either the first or third 
reference, (See 9/4/14 Tr., p. 1255, Ls. 14-20; 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1655, Ls. 5-12), 
                                            
4 The quote on page 24 of Appellant’s brief cites to “Tr. 1433, ln. 21—p. 1433, ln. 
3.”  This appears to be a typo and the correct citation to the quote is “9/5/14 Tr., 
p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433.”   
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and, as such, Capone’s challenges to that evidence are not properly before this 
Court on appeal.  See Hester, 114 Idaho at 699-700, 760 P.2d at 38-39.  
Capone did raise a “relevance” objection to the second cited reference to 
his arrest on gun charges, which reference occurred during the questioning of 
Mr. Voss, one of Capone’s cellmates.  (See 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433, 
L. 3.)  Mr. Voss first testified, without objection, that Capone told him he was in 
jail because of a “gun charge.”  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1427, L. 23 – p. 1428, L. 24.)  It 
appears that this conversation between them led to a discussion about whether 
Capone killed his wife.  (Id.)  Capone told Mr. Voss that Rachael “wasn’t coming 
back.”  (Id.)  Later during Mr. Voss’ testimony, Capone raised a relevance 
objection when Mr. Voss mentioned that Capone was in custody because he 
possessed a .22 Glock pistol.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433, L. 8.)5  The 
district court correctly overruled the objection.  As noted above, Capone’s legal 
problems regarding guns formed part of his motive to murder Rachael, and thus 
evidence of those legal problems was admitted for a proper purpose under Rule 
404(b).  Further, the fact that Capone was incarcerated was relevant to a 
materially disputed issue.  At trial, Capone disputed that he murdered Rachael, 
and his admissions to his cellmates regarding Rachael being dead and to 
                                            
5 On appeal, Capone accuses the state of “reneging on its statement” regarding 
having Capone’s cellmates testify regarding the reason for Capone’s 
incarceration.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 24.)  This accusation should not be 
considered on appeal because Capone failed to provide argument or law to 
show any error.   See Murray, 156 Idaho at 168, 321 P.3d at 718; Zichko, 129 
Idaho at 263, 923 P.3d at 970.  It is not even clear if this is some appellate claim.  
Further, even if it is considered, Capone’s accusation does not consider the 
context of the discussion between the parties at the April 9, 2014 hearing.  
(4/9/14 Tr., p. 60, L. 22 – p. 61, L. 23.)     
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burying Rachael were relevant to that disputed issue.  The district court properly 
overruled Capone’s relevance objection.  
In addition to arguing the evidence was not relevant for any proper 
purpose, Capone also argues the court failed to weigh the probative value 
against its potential for unfair prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 28-29.)  Capone, however, did not raise an I.R.E. 403 challenge to the 
evidence at trial, instead asserting only that the evidence was not relevant.  (See 
(9/4/14 Tr., p. 1432, L. 21 – p. 1433, L. 8.)  Therefore this claim is not preserved 
for appeal.   
Even if it was error to admit this statement from Mr. Voss regarding the 
gun charge, the error was harmless.  Evidence regarding Capone’s incarceration 
on gun charges was admitted at least twice without objection.  (See, e.g., 9/4/14 
Tr., p. 1255, Ls. 14-20; 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1655, Ls. 5-12).  Therefore, even if the 
district court erred in admitting Mr. Voss’ testimony about Capone’s incarceration 
on a gun charge, it was harmless because the same testimony came in several 
times without objection.   
 
3. The District Court Properly Overruled Capone’s Objections To Ms. 
Norberg’s Testimony Regarding Capone’s Prior Act Of Violence 
Against Rachael    
 
Prior to trial the state filed a notice of intent to introduce I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence regarding Capone’s stalking, harassment and attempted strangulation 
of Rachael.  (R., pp. 456-457.)  The state argued this evidence went directly to 
motive and to the course of conduct that led up to Capone killing Rachael.  
(4/9/14 Tr., p. 61, L. 24 – p. 64, L. 1.)  It was this course of conduct that 
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ultimately led to Rachael going to Capone’s shop on April 16, 2010, in part, to 
give him her final answer about whether she was going through with the divorce. 
During its direct examination of Ms. Norberg, one of Rachael’s friends, the 
state asked about a physical altercation between Capone and Rachael and what 
Capone said about it.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1002, L. 1 – p. 1006, L. 16.)  Capone 
objected claiming this was a prior bad act and prohibited under I.R.E. 404(b).  
(Id.)  The state argued that there had already been testimony regarding this 
particular physical altercation and that presentation of the evidence was 
necessary to lay the foundation for the admissibility of Rachael’s statements 
pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, and also to lay 
foundation to admit statements made by Capone.  (Id.)   
The state then elicited testimony regarding how scared and frightened 
Rachael was after this physical altercation and then asked Ms. Norberg what 
Rachael said.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 1002, L. 14 – p. 1005, L. 19.)  Capone objected on 
hearsay grounds, the district court overruled the objection, but the state 
rephrased the question anyway.  (Id.)  The state then asked Ms. Norberg what 
Capone told her about the incident.  (Id.)  Ms. Norberg testified that Capone told 
her the physical altercation was just an accident.  (Id.)   
The district court correctly overruled Capone’s objection to Ms. Norberg’s 
testimony.  Evidence of the prior physical altercation between Capone and 
Rachael was relevant both for motive and to provide context to the admissions 
made by Capone regarding Rachael not coming back to testify against him in the 
criminal case that arose out of this physical altercation.  The physical altercation 
 43 
between Capone and Rachael was what caused their separation and provided 
part of Capone’s motive to murder Rachael.  Without the separation, Rachael 
would not have been at Capone’s shop on April 16, 2010, in part, to deliver the 
ultimate decision whether they should divorce.   
Even if it was error for the district court to overrule Capone’s objections to 
Ms. Norberg’s testimony, the error was harmless because the same evidence 
came in without objection through other witnesses.  Prior to Ms. Norberg’s 
testimony, Dennis Plunkett testified about the same physical altercation between 
Capone and Rachael and testified that Capone admitted it, but blamed the 
physical altercation on rum.  (9/2/14 Tr., p. 908, L. 15 – p. 909, L. 9.)  There was 
no objection to this testimony.  (See id.)  Nor does Capone cite to Mr. Plunkett’s 
testimony on appeal.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-29.)   
Further, there were several other instances in which testimony regarding a 
physical altercation and Capone’s stalking behavior was admitted without 
objection at trial.  Captain Hally testified that Capone told him that he had been 
stalking and harassing Rachael.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1186, L. 21.)  
Captain Hally also testified that Capone told him about the physical altercation 
with Rachael.  (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1187, L. 9 – p. 1188, L. 14.)  Capone did not object 
to this testimony at trial (9/4/14 Tr., p. 1185, L. 10 – p. 1188, L. 14), nor has he 
cited it on appeal (see Appellant’s brief, 20-29).    
Mr. Glass also testified without objection that Capone told him that the 
strangulation case in Asotin County was no big deal because he barely choked 
Rachael and it was all a misunderstanding.  (9/5/14 Tr., p. 1455, L. 2-19.)  
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Capone said he was not trying to kill Rachael.  (Id.)  It was in the context of this 
conversation about the strangulation case that Capone made the incriminating 
admission that Rachael was not going to show up to testify against him because 
she was “pushing up daises.”   
Q. Okay.  Did [Capone] talk about whether the prosecutor had 
a case? 
 
A. Yeah.  Then he starts talking about the case that he’s 
dealing with up here in Moscow; that if they can’t find the body, 
there’s no murder.  There’s no case.  No body, no – no case.  
 
Q. Did you talk to him about what if Rachael shows up and 
testifies against him?  
 
A. I asked him – I said, you’d be fucked if Rachael showed up 
and testified against you.  And he says, she ain’t doing nothing but 
pushing up daises.  
 
Q. And how did you react to that?  
 
A. It was pretty chilling for him to say that.  
 
(9/5/14 Tr., p. 1455, L. 20 – p. 1456, L. 7.)  Capone did not object to any of this 
testimony.  (See 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1454, L. 17 – p. 1456, L. 12.)   
The district court did not err when it overruled Capone’s objection 
regarding Ms. Norberg’s testimony about a prior physical altercation between 
Capone and Rachael.  Even if it was error, it was harmless, because, as noted 
above, this same evidence was admitted from other witnesses without objection.   
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IV. 
The District Court Did Not Err By Granting The State’s Motion To Exclude 
Evidence Of Certain Witnesses’ Prior Criminal Convictions Under I.R.E. 609 
 
A. Introduction 
 The district court granted the state’s motion to exclude evidence of Mr. 
Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ prior convictions.  The district court found their prior 
convictions were not relevant to credibility under I.R.E. 609.  (R., p. 1571.)  On 
appeal, Capone argues the district “court erred by refusing to allow the witnesses 
to be impeached by non-remote burglary convictions.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 30-
34 (underlining omitted).)  Capone’s argument on appeal fails.  While evidence 
of a burglary conviction can sometimes be used to impeach a witness’ credibility 
under Rule 609, the admissibility of such conviction is determined on a case-by-
case basis and Capone has failed to show that the district court erred in 
deciding, in this case, that Mr. Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ convictions were not relevant 
to credibility.  Even if there was error, it was harmless.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) the trial court must apply a two-
prong test to determine whether evidence of the prior conviction should be 
admitted: (1) the trial court must determine whether the fact or nature of the 
conviction is relevant to the witness’ credibility; and (2) if so, the trial court 
determines whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect.  State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 (1999) 
(citation omitted).  When the appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision as 
to the first prong, concerning relevance, the standard of review is de novo.  Id. 
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(citation omitted)).  The appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision as to the 
second prong, concerning whether the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect, for an abuse of discretion.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Excluded 
Evidence Of Two Witnesses’ Prior Burglary Convictions 
 
 Prior to trial the state moved to exclude evidence of Mr. Voss’ and Mr. 
Glass’ prior criminal history.  (R., pp. 485-486.)  At the hearing on the pre-trial 
motions, Capone argued that Mr. Voss’ 2010 burglary conviction was a crime of 
moral turpitude and was relevant to his credibility.  (See 4/9/14 Tr., p. 6, L. 4 – p. 
7, L. 14.)  Capone also objected to excluding Mr. Glass’ 2006 burglary 
conviction.  (Id.)  The district court granted the state’s motion, ruling that the prior 
convictions were not relevant to credibility.  (R., p. 1571.) 
On appeal, Capone argues the district court erred when it granted the 
state’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of Mr. Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ criminal 
history, contending it is unclear how the district court reached its decision that 
the prior convictions were not relevant to Mr. Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ credibility.  
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 30-34.)  The district court did not err.   
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) allows the use of both the fact and nature 
of a witness’s prior felony conviction for impeachment only if the court 
determines they are relevant to the witness’s credibility and only if the probative 
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.  See I.R.E. 609(a).  Under 
the first prong of the Rule 609 test, the prior convictions were not relevant to 
credibility.  (R., p. 1571.)  The Idaho courts have noted that the question of the 
 47 
relevancy of prior felonies for the purpose of attacking a witness's credibility is a 
thorny one.  State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 789, 275 P.3d 12, 15 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(citing State v. Allen, 113 Idaho 676, 678, 747 P.2d 85, 87 (Ct. App. 1987)).  
“The ‘varied relationships between felony convictions and witness credibility have 
produced much disagreement among courts and commentators about the 
particular crimes suitable for impeachment.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Pierce, 107 
Idaho 96, 103, 685 P.2d 837, 844 (Ct. App. 1984)).  
Idaho courts have divided felonies into three categories having varying 
degrees of probative value on the issue of credibility.  Id.   
Crimes in the first category, such as perjury, are intimately 
connected to a person’s veracity and credibility, while crimes in the 
second category, like robbery and burglary, are somewhat less 
relevant to credibility because they do not deal directly with veracity 
and have only a general relationship with honesty.  Offenses in the 
third category, which include crimes of passion and acts of violence 
that are the product of emotional impulse, have been said to have 
little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity.  
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Rule 609 requires a case-by-case analysis to 
determine whether a particular felony is relevant to credibility.  See id.  What kind 
of theft crime was committed informs the analysis.  See id. (“For example, while 
theft crimes generally do not involve dishonest or false statements, such crimes 
may be committed by fraudulent or deceitful means and fall into the first 
category.”)   
As the Idaho Court of Appeals noted in Grist, burglary is “somewhat less 
relevant to credibility because [it does] not deal directly with veracity and [has] 
only a general relationship with honesty.”  Grist, 152 Idaho at 789, 275 P.3d at 
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15.  Therefore, a burglary conviction is not automatically relevant to credibility.6  
Capone does not cite to anything other than the general proposition that burglary 
“can” be relevant to credibility, and does not cite to any evidence showing that 
either Mr. Voss’ 2010  burglary conviction or Mr. Glass’ 2006 burglary conviction 
resulted from fraudulent or deceitful behavior such that the convictions would be 
relevant to credibility and admissible under I.R.E. 609.  Having failed to point to 
any evidence in the record demonstrating the burglary convictions were actually 
relevant to credibility, Capone has failed to show the district court erred in 
excluding evidence of the prior convictions.   
 
D. Even If The District Court Erred In Granting The State’s Motion In Limine, 
The Error Was Harmless 
 
 The district court did not err when it determined that Mr. Voss’ 2010 
burglary conviction and Mr. Glass’ 2006 burglary conviction were not relevant to 
their credibility at trial.  However, even if the district court erred, the error was 
harmless.  “Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously 
objected to, this Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test.”  
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600-01, 301 P.3d 242, 258-259 (2013) (citation 
omitted).  “[T]he error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the 
same without the error.”  Id. at 598, 301 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted).   
                                            
6 A person can be guilty of burglary if they enter a building with the intent to 
commit “any felony.”  See I.C. § 18-1401.  Thus, someone can be guilty of a 
burglary if they enter a building to commit a violent felony, which would have very 
little to do with that person’s veracity.   
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Capone was able to challenge Mr. Voss’ and Mr. Glass’ credibility on a 
variety of issues.  (See e.g. 9/5/14 Tr., p. 1439, L. 23 – p. 1445, L. 8, p. 1470, L. 
3 – p. 1480, L. 7,  p. 1489, L. 1 – p. 1490, L. 5, p. 1493, L. 3 – p. 1497, L. 14, p. 
1501, Ls. 3-19; Ex. R.)  Because reference to their prior convictions would not 
have changed the result of the trial, any error was harmless.   
 
V. 
Capone’s Cumulative Error Claim Fails Because He Has Failed To Show Error, 
Much Less Multiple Errors To Cumulate 
 
 Capone argues the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal of his 
convictions.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 34-35.)  Under the doctrine of cumulative 
error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate 
show the absence of a fair trial.  “However, a necessary predicate to the 
application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error.”  State v. Parker, 
157 Idaho 132, 149, 334 P.3d 806, 823 (2014) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2008)).  Because Capone has failed to show any 
error, there is no error to cumulate in this case.  Alternatively, even if errors in the 
trial had been shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that 
would require reversal.  State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. 
App. 2000) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless).  Capone has failed to 
show any cumulative error.   
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VI. 
Capone Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Denied His Motion For A New Trial 
 
A. Introduction 
 Capone filed a Motion for a New Trial, arguing that Mr. Glass’ purported 
statement to a Mr. Beyer in July 2013 constituted new evidence.  (See Aug. R., 
pp. 1-7.)  The district court denied Capone’s motion, finding that the statement 
was not material and would have only been used for impeachment.  (Aug. R., pp. 
29-35.)  Further, the district court found that the statement would not have 
provided sufficient evidence to change the jury verdict, because there was 
substantial evidence of Capone’s guilt.  (Id.)  Capone has failed to show the 
district court abused its discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court’s 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused.  
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Capone’s 
Motion For A New Trial 
 
After Capone was convicted and sentenced, he filed a motion for a new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence. (See Aug. R., pp. 1-7.)  The new 
evidence consisted of the following: On March 9, 2015, Deputy Demyer reported 
that he obtained a statement from a Tyler Beyer who was being booked into jail 
with a BAC of .20.  (Id.)  Mr. Beyer claimed that in July 2013, Mr. Stone told him 
that they would never find Rachael’s body in the river because it was not there.  
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(Id.)  The district court found that the statement purportedly made by Mr. Stone 
to Mr. Beyer was not material and would have been admissible only for 
impeachment.  (Aug. R., pp. 29-35.)  Further, the district court found that the 
statement would not have provided sufficient evidence to change the jury verdict.  
(Id.)   
On appeal, Capone argues the district court abused its discretion.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, pp. 37-38.)  Capone is incorrect.   A defendant may obtain a 
new trial “[w]hen new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, and 
which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at 
the trial.”  I.C. § 19-2406(7).  In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 
(1976), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the four-part test a defendant must 
satisfy in order to be entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered 
evidence.  That test requires a defendant to show that the evidence offered in 
support of his motion for a new trial (1) is newly discovered and was unknown to 
the defendant at the time of trial; (2) is material, not merely cumulative or 
impeaching; (3) will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the 
evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the defendant.  Id. at 691, 
551 P.2d at 978.  In announcing this four-part test, the Court recognized that, 
“after a man has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper 
reluctance to give him a second trial.”  Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 
978 (citation omitted).  “Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence are disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the 
importance accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, 
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and conservation of scarce judicial resources.”  State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 
144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (quotations and citations omitted).  Application of 
the Drapeau test to the facts of this case supports the district court’s denial of 
Capone’s motion for new trial.   
 
1. Capone Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion When It Found The Evidence Was Not Material 
 
Even assuming the evidence was newly discovered, the second prong of 
the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a new trial on the grounds of 
newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed evidence is material to his 
guilt or innocence, and is not merely impeaching.  Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 
P.2d at 978.  The Idaho Court of Appeals has described the difference between 
impeachment evidence and substantive evidence as follows: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of 
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which 
the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is 
that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the 
effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. 
 
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 The district court found that Capone failed the second prong of the 
Drapeau standard because Mr. Beyer’s statement regarding what Mr. Stone said 
was inadmissible hearsay and would only have been impeaching, not material 
evidence.  (Aug. R., pp. 33-34.)  The district court was correct on both counts.   
 On appeal, Capone first argues that Mr. Beyer’s statements regarding 
what Mr. Stone said constitute non-hearsay as an “admission of a party 
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opponent.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 37 (citing I.R.E. 801(d)(2).)  Capone is incorrect.  
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) states, in relevant part:   
(d) Statements Which are not Hearsay.  A statement is not 
hearsay if— 
 
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent.  The statement is offered 
against a party and is … (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
 
I.R.E. 801(d)(2).   
“The co-conspirator exception has been succinctly described as follows: ‘If 
A and B are engaged in a conspiracy, the acts and declarations of B, occurring 
while the conspiracy is actually in progress and in furtherance of the design, are 
provable against A ....’”  State v. Caldero, 109 Idaho 80, 85–86, 705 P.2d 85, 
90–91 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 267, at 792 
(3d ed. 1984)).  Mr. Stone’s purported statement was not offered against 
Capone.  It was only offered against Mr. Stone, who was not a party.  Further, 
Mr. Stone’s purported statements to Mr. Beyer did not occur in furtherance of 
any conspiracy.  The conspiracy to not report Rachael’s death would not be 
furthered by Mr. Stone telling Mr. Beyer that Rachael’s body was not in the river.  
See, e.g., Caldero, 109 Idaho at 86-87, 705 P.2d at 91-92.  The district court was 
correct in ruling that Mr. Beyer’s testimony about Mr. Stone’s purported testimony 
would be inadmissible hearsay.   
Mr. Stone’s purported statement to Mr. Beyer were also merely 
impeaching evidence and was not material to Capone’s guilt or innocence.  On 
appeal, Capone argues that Mr. Stone’s statement is substantive evidence 
because the jury could understand it to mean there is no body, and therefore no 
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murder.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 38.)  Capone argues it is up to the jury to 
decide what Mr. Beyer’s testimony could mean.  (Id.)  Capone is incorrect.  It is 
up to the district court to make findings on a motion for new trial, and those 
findings will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear error.  See State v. Ames, 
112 Idaho 144, 146, 730 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Ct. App. 1986).  Capone has failed to 
show the district court committed clear error in its finding that this statement did 
not provide evidence material to the crimes charged.    
The evidence is also not substantive because the purported statement 
made by Mr. Stone occurred in July 2013.  (See Aug. R. pp. 30-31.)  Mr. Stone’s 
testimony at trial was that he continually lied and denied any involvement with 
Rachael’s disappearance and it was only after the preliminary hearing that he 
decided to confess.  (See 9/9/14 Tr., p. 1853, L. 21 – p. 1859, L. 12.)  The 
preliminary hearing occurred from July 30 to August 1, 2013.  (R., pp. 248-271.)  
It was not until November 12 and 20, 2013 that Mr. Stone gave a full interview to 
investigators.  (R., pp. 442-445.)  When Mr. Stone made this purported 
statement to Mr. Beyer in July 2013,  Mr. Stone was still lying about his 
involvement with Rachael’s disappearance.  This lying would presumably include 
lying about Rachael’s body not being in the river – especially if that is where it 
was.  Mr. Stone’s purported statement to Mr. Beyer was not material, it was just 
part of the lie that Mr. Stone lived for three-and-half years.  The district court’s 
finding was correct.   
 
 55 
2. Capone Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion When It Found The Evidence Was Not Likely To 
Produce An Acquittal 
 
The third prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a 
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed 
evidence would have “probably” produced an acquittal if admitted at trial.  
Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978.  The district court found that there 
was substantial evidence of Capone’s guilt and the statement Mr. Stone 
purportedly made to Mr. Beyer in July 2013 would not have probably produced 
an acquittal.  (Aug. R., p. 34.) 
Further, the Court finds that even had the statement been allowed 
at trial, there is nothing in the record of this case that indicates this 
statement alone would have provided sufficient evidence such that 
the jury would have acquitted the Defendant.  There was 
substantial evidence presented to the jury which supported the 
finding of guilt in this matter.  Therefore, the Defendant has not met 
the second and third prongs of the Drapeau test.  The Defendant’s 
motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is 
denied.  
  
(Id.)  Capone has failed to show the district court’s finding was in error.  The 
district court presided over the trial and was familiar with all of the evidence 
presented.  As noted above, this purported statement by Mr. Stone in July of 
2013 was simply part of Mr. Stone’s denial of his involvement.  Capone failed to 
show that this single purported statement would have impacted the trial, let alone 
have been sufficient to “probably” produce an acquittal.   
 The district court properly denied Capone’s Motion for a New Trial, and 
Capone has failed to show otherwise.   
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CONCLUSION 
  
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Capone’s convictions.   
 DATED this 6th day of March, 2017. 
 
            
        /s/  Ted S. Tollefson_______________ 
      TED S. TOLLEFSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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